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WHERE IS THE “QUALITY MOVEMENT” IN LAW
PRACTICE?
WILLIAM H. SIMON*
The “Quality Movement” that originated in industrial production
and has since influenced the professions prescribes standardized work, root
cause analysis of errors, peer review, and performance measurement.
While these reforms have transformed medicine and some other
professions, their influence has lagged in the legal profession. This Essay
reviews the limited progress of the reforms in law and assesses the cultural,
institutional, and doctrinal obstacles they face.

Introduction .......................................................................... 101
I.
The Turn to Quality ...................................................... 103
II.
Quality Reforms and Law Practice.................................... 105
A. Standardized Work. ................................................... 106
B. Root Cause Analysis .................................................. 109
C. Peer Review ............................................................ 111
D. Performance Measurement.......................................... 114
III.
Obstacles to Quality Efforts in Law Practice ...................... 116
A. Professional Culture .................................................. 116
B. Economic Context..................................................... 118
C. Confidentiality.......................................................... 119
Conclusion............................................................................ 121

INTRODUCTION
The quality movement that transformed manufacturing in the midtwentieth century is having a profound influence on the professions
these days.
The quest for “total quality” or “continuous
improvement” is visibly reshaping basic norms and practices in
engineering, social work, education, and medicine.1
Law, however, has been substantially bypassed in this trend. The
market for legal services and the economic organization of law firms
are vastly different from what they were a few decades ago. But the
Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1.
I use the term quality movement to embrace a convergent set of reforms
that include “lean production” manufacturing and “evidence-based” social service
practice. E.g., JAMES P. WOMACK & DANIEL T. JONES, LEAN THINKING (1996); Bruce A.
Thyer, What Is Evidence-Based Practice?, in FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE-BASED
SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 35 (Albert R. Roberts & Kenneth R. Yeager eds., 2006).

*
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production process is much less changed. It tends to lack key features
prescribed by the quality movement. The rhetoric associated with the
quality movement is increasingly familiar to lawyers, and there have
been some notable reform initiatives. However, reforms seem to be
more limited or more superficial in law than in other professions.
The issues raised by the quality movement are fundamental. Most
obviously, they concern the cost and efficacy of service to clients.
They also reach questions of the profession’s gatekeeper or
compliance roles. As Donald Langevoort has explained, much
corporate noncompliance arises less from calculated deviance than
from cognitive and emotional disabilities.2 The quality movement
suggests that the strength of these disabilities is not invariant but
depends in part on organizational context, and the practices it
recommends are designed to mitigate them.
In addition, the quality movement raises important issues about
pride and satisfaction in work. As economic pressures increase, law
practice is becoming more stressful and more regimented. Lawyers
may feel that their autonomy and opportunities for creativity are
shrinking. The quality movement has an important but ambiguous
relation to these concerns. The practical reforms associated with the
movement tend to routinize practice and intensify monitoring of it. In
this sense, the movement might seem a threat to personal satisfaction
in work, and certainly, many quality movement initiatives seem crassly
materialistic and oppressively bureaucratic.3 But others are more
ambitious. In this more ambitious perspective, while the reforms limit
individual autonomy, they enlist lawyers in a collective project of selfassessment and institutional improvement that might prove personally
satisfying.
In attempting to make work more transparent and
adaptable, the reforms have the potential for making it more reflective
and thus in a sense, more professional, than the informal and slow-tochange structures they would replace.
In Part I, I introduce the quality movement and discuss some
indications that problems of the sort that it has responded to in other
areas are present in the legal profession. Part II describes the four
main practical prescriptions of the movement—standardized work, root
cause analysis of errors, peer review, and performance measurement. I
suggest that, while these practices have made some headway in the

2.
E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House
Lawyers, Enterprise Risk and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. xxx.
See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk
3.
Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1909 (2006) (arguing that some of the practices associated
with the quality movement are in tension with professional ideals).
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profession, all are less prominent than they are elsewhere, and two of
them—root cause analysis and peer review—are barely visible.
Part III briefly considers some of the obstacles to a more thorough
embrace of quality reforms in law. These obstacles are cultural,
institutional, and doctrinal. By and large, they seem the product of a
conception of law practice that is out of date, and not just because of
economic change. The traditional doctrines of professionalism have
assumed that lawyering tends to be both individual and ineffable. The
paradigmatic lawyer was the sole practitioner.
His work was
considered impractical to observe, and except in egregious cases, to
evaluate. Thus, both law firms and regulators focused their efforts to
insure quality on entry decisions—hiring for the firms and licensing for
the regulators—rather than on direct and ongoing regulation of
quality. The premises of this approach are no longer true. Lawyers
increasingly practice in large organizations, and both within and across
organizations, in teams. There are norms and tools for the assessment
of practice that are far richer than lawyers have traditionally used.
Organizational clients have professional assistance that enables
sophisticated observation and assessment of their lawyers. The quality
movement seems potentially a useful response to these developments.
I. THE TURN TO QUALITY
A milestone in the emergence of the quality movement in the
professions was the 1991 Harvard study of hospital medical errors.
Re-examining randomly selected cases from New York hospitals, the
researchers found serious errors in nearly four percent.4 Later
research produced even more striking findings. “Studies have found
that at least 30 percent of patients with stroke receive incomplete or
inappropriate care from their doctors, as do 45 percent of patients with
asthma and 60 percent of patients with pneumonia.”5
Taking a cue from the manufacturing sector, the quality reformers
in medicine argue that such studies indicate the need for organizational
reform. “New laboratory science is not the key to saving lives,” Atul
Gawande writes.6 “The infant science of improving performance—of

4.
Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in
Hospitalized Patients—Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 370, 370-71 (1991).
5.
ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT
10 (2009).
6.
ATUL GAWANDE, BETTER: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON PERFORMANCE 242
(2007).
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implementing our existing know-how—is.”7 The fundamental principle
of this infant science is what the Japanese automakers call kaizen—
continuous self-assessment and self-correction. So far, its key
organizational features seem to be standardized work, root cause
analysis, peer review, and performance measurement.
It is not possible to do a Harvard-type study of randomly selected
cases for lawyering errors. Yet, there is no reason to believe that, if
such a study could be done, the results would be any less disturbing
than those of the medical studies. Both our general knowledge of
organizational behavior and the occasional glimpses of the inner
workings of law practice we get when things go visibly wrong suggest
that errors occur routinely.
A spectacular example is the indictment and conviction of Arthur
Andersen on obstruction-of-justice charges arising from the
destruction of Enron-related documents in 2001. (The conviction was
later reversed on procedural grounds after the firm had ceased
operating.) One of the bases of the charges was a two-sentence email from an in-house Andersen lawyer in Chicago, sent shortly after
Enron’s accounting manipulations became public and the SEC began
investigating. The e-mail suggested that the head of the Houston
office “consider reminding” the Enron team of the firm’s document
retention policy and enclosed the policy’s URL reference.8
Prosecutors alleged that the lawyer intended to encourage mass
shredding of Enron documents, which in fact occurred. The lawyer
asserted in her defense that she was only urging her colleagues to be
“compliant” with the policy.9 Regardless of which interpretation is
accepted, the story suggests significant deficiencies in the provision of
legal advice to Andersen, and not just in the conduct of this one
lawyer. Even if we credit the lawyer’s testimony about her motives,
sending a citation to a written policy without explanation is hardly an
effective way to advise a client in a high-stakes sensitive situation.
However, the quality movement warns that we should look beyond
individual mistakes in situations like this. In disasters of all kinds—
from airplane crashes to financial mismanagement—“human error”
usually turns out to be the consequence of defective organizational
structures and practices.
At Andersen, the task of advising on a difficult question with
momentous stakes was left, whether by design or inadvertence, to a
Id. at 242-43.
Destruction of Enron-Related Documents by Andersen Personnel:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 45 (2002).
Id. at 137-38.
9.
7.
8.
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single lawyer to perform on her own. Apparently, Andersen and its
lawyers had no written protocol for dealing with document issues when
it learned that an investigation or proceeding had been initiated. The
general policy document transmitted with the e-mail, far from offering
specific advice tailored to the situation, was a mass of ambiguities and
contradictions. (A third interpretation of the lawyer’s motivations—in
addition to the prosecutor’s claim she was urging destruction and her
own claim that she was urging compliance—is that she didn’t know
what the right advice to give was because the written policy was
incomprehensible.) This was not a situation that was hard to
anticipate. Enron followed a series of high-profile financial disclosure
scandals, including those arising from Waste Management and
Sunbeam, that had entangled Andersen in many costly proceedings.
Yet, Andersen’s lawyers failed to prepare it to respond effectively.
A more extensive body of data implying lawyer error has emerged
in connection with the investigations into the backdating of stock
option grants at public companies. The SEC has investigated more
than a hundred companies, and more than eighty have restated
earnings in connection with backdating concerns. Using statistical
modeling correlating stock prices with grant dates, economists Randall
Heron and Erik Lie estimated that options were backdated or
comparably manipulated at 29.2% of the 7,774 firms in their database
between 1996 and 2005.10
Although we don’t know much about particular circumstances,
there are no plausible explanations of this phenomenon that do not
involve widespread failures of lawyer judgment. In a large fraction of
cases, the executives who signed off on the grants did not benefit
directly, and many, including Apple’s Steve Jobs, have said that they
didn’t know that the backdating was illegal. In virtually all cases,
lawyers could have stopped the practice by admonishing the
executives, or if necessary, the board. No doubt the most common
excuse is that the lawyers were unaware of the practice, but it seems
likely that, for each of these firms, there was some lawyer (whether
inside or outside) who should have known what was happening in this
critical compliance area.
II. QUALITY REFORMS AND LAW PRACTICE
Recognizing that error occurs routinely even among highly
qualified and respected practitioners led to quality movements in
10.
Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to
Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?, 55 MGMT. SCI. 513, 514
(2009).

SIMON - PROOF II

106

4/4/2012 4:00:07 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

medicine and other professions. Yet, there is no movement with that
name in law. True, there are some trends in law firm management that
resonate with quality movement reforms. There is a stronger emphasis
on group practice and collaborative judgment than in the past. Law
firms usually have ethics committees and opinion committees, and
these committees seem to have increasingly more authority. In-house
training programs are better configured to address issues that arise in
practice. A range of services rate law firms on the basis of client
satisfaction reports. Yet, such developments have been more modest
than in other professions.
The basic types of reform the quality movement prescribes are
standardized work, systematic error detection, peer review, and
performance measurement. In the legal profession, quality rhetoric is
usually associated with standardization and performance measurement,
though the need and potential is at least as great for error detection
and peer review.

A. Standardized Work
Quality reforms require the codification of work practices in
detailed protocols or checklists. It is useful to distinguish two types of
norms found in such codifications.
Some norms routinize practice either by dictating specific
conduct, such as the angle that a nurse should hold a syringe in
making an injection, or directing that the actor check that certain
indicators are within an appropriate range, such as the instrument
checks pilots do when preparing for take-off. Other norms regulate
the process of making decisions that may themselves be non-routine.
When engineers develop new software products, they use a
standardized development process, even as they produce non-standard
products. The surgery checklist that Gawande developed with the
World Health Organization has both types of norms. For example, a
routinizing norm directs that a nurse do and report a sponge and
instrument count. A decision process norm prescribes, “Anesthesia
team reviews [with surgery and nursing teams whether there] . . . are
any patient-specific concerns.”11
Formal experiment showed that the checklist improved practice,
even though it was addressed to one of the most sophisticated
contexts of professional endeavor.12 Protocols help, not only by
11.
WORLD ALLIANCE FOR PATIENT SAFETY, SURGERY SAFETY CHECKLIST,
(2008),
available
at
http://www.who.int/patientsafety/safesurgery/
ss_checklist/en/; see GAWANDE, supra note 5, at 136-41.
See GAWANDE, supra note 5, at 142-57.
12.
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reminding practitioners of things they are prone to forget, but by
inducing reflectiveness, communication, and transparency.
The
function of rules in the new quality movement is different from their
function in traditional bureaucracy. Their primary goal is not to
minimize discretion. Indeed, often, the rules are not supposed to be
followed if there’s a good reason to do otherwise (though the deviation
and the reason for it must typically be documented). Their
key
function is to facilitate change by making practice more self-conscious
and transparent. Formulating the rules requires that people reflect on
what they do. Following the rules allows them to compare their
experiences.
“Only when you have standardization can you
systematically improve your operations,” a manufacturing text
advises.13 The process of measuring the relative efficacy of different
practices requires that we be able to specify the practices that
produced the outcomes.
In law, checklists and other forms of standardization have long
been associated with some tasks, such as “due diligence” in securities
offerings, and more recently, venture capital financings. Some lawyers
have reported more ambitious efforts. The reports occasionally
embrace the rhetoric and practices associated with the industrial
quality movement. The Association of Corporate Counsel has been a
leader with its Value Challenge, which encourages and facilitates
information about quality-oriented collaboration between in-house
lawyers and outside counsel.14 A few law firms, including Seyfarth
Shaw, and in-house legal staffs, including Dupont’s, have adopted the
quality management methodology known as Six Sigma. Some have
even gone so far as to have themselves certified by one of the various
organizations that train and assess Six Sigma skills. 15
Although the accounts of these efforts are often vague, all of them
seem to involve an effort to standardize work to facilitate continuous
re-assessment and improvement. Typically, the initiative begins by
defining a set of client goals and then mapping and analyzing the
associated legal services in an effort to trim waste and improve
coordination.

13.
PRODUCTIVITY PRESS DEV. TEAM, STANDARD WORK FOR THE SHOPFLOOR 10
(2002).
14.
ACC Value Challenge, ASS’N CORP. COUNS., http://www.acc.com/
valuechallenge/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
15.
Thomas L. Sager & Scott L. Winkelman, Six Sigma: Positioning for
Competitive Advantage, 19 ACCA DOCKET 18 (2001) (in-house lawyer and outside
counsel describing adoption of Six Sigma at Dupont); Elaine Schmidt, Law and Order:
64-Year-Old Firm Adapts Six Sigma to the Delivery and Billing of Legal Services, ISIX
SIGMA MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 26.
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Nevertheless, insofar as one can estimate from available
information, current standardization efforts appear limited in some
respects. First, they seem to be disproportionately focused on
relatively simple and repetitive tasks that can be governed by
routinizing norms and less attentive to relatively complex and
differentiated tasks that call for decision process norms. There is
particular enthusiasm for standardization of tasks that can either be
given to on-site paraprofessional staff or outsourced. E-discovery has
been subject to especially sophisticated standardization efforts.16
Reformers also report efforts to standardize more complex but
repetitive tasks such as employment litigation, intellectual property
licensing, and environmental compliance. They generally do not
describe such efforts specifically enough to give a sense of what they
involve.
We hear little in these discussions about the standardization of
the kind of decisions involved in the Andersen meltdown and the
backdating scandals. These are high-stakes decisions that cannot be
routinized but that could benefit from protocols standardizing
consultation, deliberation, and documentation. I mentioned that the
fateful in-house decision that led to the shredding of Enron documents
was left to a single junior lawyer to make on her own with virtually no
written guidance. Backdating had many variations, including some
involving deliberate wrongdoing.
But as Victor Fleischer has
suggested, many seem to have involved inadequate administrative
structures that left matters to ungoverned low-visibility decisions by
solitary actors.17 Many managers claimed that their actions were
approved by the auditors, although in most such instances it appears
that the alleged approvals took the form of ambiguous oral statements
rather than clear written ones. Protocols of the sort that Gawande
developed that combine routinizing and decision process norms would
likely have helped avoid some of the failures that resulted.
A second possible limitation suggested by some reports is that
there is much more concern with cost-cutting than with quality
improvement or practice innovation. The reports frequently boast of
dramatic and specific cost savings. They rarely describe striking
innovations. It is possible that this imbalance reflects concerns that
disclosure of practice innovations will lead to a loss of competitive
advantage, but I doubt it. Competitors share a good deal of technical
information in most industries. Lawyers do not seem to be an
16.
KPMG, SIX SIGMA IN THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT: OBTAINING MEASURABLE
QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS IN DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT (2006).
17.
Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate
Culture, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1031, 1045-52 (2007).
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exception. At bar association and continuing legal education sessions,
lawyers are constantly telling their peers how they accomplish their
successes. They may do this in the hope that others will reciprocate
to their benefit. Or they may do this because it is the only credible
way to demonstrate their superior expertise and thus obtain the
prestige and referrals that it attracts.18 Thus, it seems revealing that,
so far, the quality literature has more to say about cost than about
quality.
Third, the reports are ambiguous about the effect of quality
undertakings on hierarchy. Standardization can be a way of enlisting
all workers in re-assessment and innovation, or it can be a way of
imposing hierarchical judgments on lower-status workers.19 Some of
the legal reports have a technocratic flavor that suggests the latter.
Of course, hierarchy may be the most efficient way to organize some
kinds of work. But to the extent that we are interested in the
potential of the quality movement to vindicate the aspirations of
traditional professionalism for meaningful work, the more bureaucratic
forms of standardization have a cost.

B. Root Cause Analysis
A key premise of the quality movement is that mistakes are
learning opportunities. Since mistakes are usually consequences of
structures and processes, analyzing mistakes diagnostically can reveal
potential institutional improvements.
Japanese auto manufacturing prescribes that mistakes be
addressed in terms of the “5 Whys.” For example, the immediate
problem is that a machine is malfunctioning, but when we trace back
the root cause, we find that the malfunction occurred because the
worker failed to maintain it properly, that he failed to maintain it
properly because he was pre-occupied with another machine that kept
jamming, and that the second machine jammed because of a design
defect in the part that it stamped. The most useful intervention is to
re-design the part, but we never learn that if we stop at the “human
error” of the maintenance worker.

18.
ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 77-91 (2005) (explaining
why innovators often freely reveal their innovations).
19.
For an example of the egalitarian version, see MICHEL GREIF, THE VISUAL
FACTORY: BUILDING PARTICIPATION THROUGH SHARED INFORMATION 213 (1989) (“By
decentralizing and providing management tools at the production location [i.e.,
practice standards and performance indicators], management has in effect expanded
the number of managers.”).
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Mention of error detection and root cause analysis is rare in the
legal literature on quality management. An interesting exception in a
discussion by KPMG of how Six Sigma might be applied to e-discovery
gives an example of the 5 Whys applied to errors in decisions as to
whether material is privileged:

Why #1: Why are there too many defects related to privilege
calls and redactions?
Answer: The review team may not have case specifics.
Why #2: Why doesn’t the review team have the case-specific

information necessary to make accurate privilege calls and
redactions?
Answer: The review team does not have a list of all custodian
and counsel names to track attorney-client communication
that could potentially be privileged or require redaction.

Why #3: What custodian names and counsel names pertain to
this matter?
Answer: A list of 20 custodian and 5 counsel names was
provided to the review team.

Why #4: It the list accurate? What about the surrounding
privilege and confidential issues related to Joe Smith and
Kelli Jones?
Answer: We don’t see Joe Smith or Kelli Jones on this list of
custodian or counsel names. This could be a root cause!20
Most of the legal quality literature is silent on error detection and
correction. This is particularly surprising with respect to Six Sigma
partisans, since the term Six Sigma refers to a mathematical ratio
(three per million) proposed in the industrial engineering literature to
designate an acceptable error rate.21 This particular standard is
arbitrary even in the manufacturing context, and there is no reason to
think that it has any application to law practice. Yet, the legal
literature does not discuss how errors are addressed or what are
acceptable tolerances.
While KPMG’s effort to apply Six Sigma to law practice is thus
innovative, the example quoted above is inept in a symptomatic way.
The analysis treats as four separate stages what is really a single
cause—the review team lacks a complete counsel/custodian list. More
importantly, it appears to stop prematurely. There is no canonical way
to define what constitutes a single “Why”, and “5” is an illustrative
number, rather than a requirement. The basic goal is to trace back
20.
21.

KPMG, supra note 16, at 16-17.
Sager & Winkelman, supra note 15, at 18.
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the problem as far as is likely to be productive. Yet, in KPMG’s
example, it seems likely that it would be worthwhile to go another step
or two. Why doesn’t the review team have a complete list? Is it
because the list was compiled or taken from some separate source that
has inaccuracies? (If so, the remedy should extend to that source.) Is
it because the team does not include people who have access or the
ability to interpret essential information. (If so, the team or its lines of
communication should be re-configured.)
One could imagine that KPMG’s truncated analysis might lead to
the conclusion that whoever failed to give the team a complete list
should be blamed and disciplined. Such a conclusion would be
contrary to the spirit of root cause analysis, which is intended to
counter the tendency among both regulators and companies to
individualize responsibility. The danger of this tendency is that it may
discourage the systemic perspective. The SEC has disciplined a few
lawyers, including Apple’s General Counsel, in connection with
backdating, but, understandably, it has prioritized cases of intentional
wrongdoing, especially for direct personal gain, and has thus focused
on individual motivation, rather than defective structures and
processes. Law firms appear spontaneously inclined to take the
individual perspective. When they are caught in a scandal, they often
look for individual wrongdoers and respond by disciplining or firing
them.22 A consultant for liability insurers tells me that, when he visits
a firm where serious professional failure has occurred, the most
common response he hears is, “We had a problem, but we got rid of
him.”
Firms understandably seek to minimize publicity around scandals;
so we have limited information of how they respond to the discovery of
high-stakes errors. But as far as we know, they tend not to respond
with structural re-assessment and reform. There is no indication that
any of the firms or in-house staffs implicated in the backdating cases
responded with anything resembling root cause analysis.

C. Peer Review
Gawande and others have pointed to the Mayo Clinic and Western
Medical Associates in Grand Junction, Colorado, as a kind of
healthcare “gold standard” that combines effective treatment with low
costs. One of the key distinguishing features of these organizations is

22.
An example is Milbank Tweed’s response to the perjury prosecution of
one of its bankruptcy partners. MILTON C. REGAN, EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A
WALL STREET LAWYER 229-31 (2006).
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strong peer review.23 Peer review enlists social pressures of shame and
honor in favor of good performance, and it facilitates sharing of
information. It also encourages the professionals being reviewed to be
more reflective and articulate about their practice.
Peer review takes many forms, but in medicine, the most
demanding and rewarding form is the case analysis in which the
treatment of a particular patient or group of patients is critically
appraised by a group of colleagues. This is the type of review that
most directly and richly engages professional skills. Legislatures,
licensing authorities, hospital accreditation bodies, and third-party
payers require a range of case-focused peer review processes. For
example, hospital “mortality reviews” assess the treatment of patients
who die in the hospital. The focus is on errors or sub-optimal care.
The treating doctors explain what they did and receive critical
feedback from peers. Hospitals are supposed to engage in routine peer
review of staff and attending physicians. The review includes scrutiny
of a sample of the physician’s cases. And third-party payers routinely
undertake “utilization reviews” that assess the medical necessity of
the treatment provided.24
As the quality movement has advanced in education and social
work, such review has become more common in those fields. Kathleen
Noonan, Charles Sabel, and I recently described an impressive peer
review process performed in the child protective service agencies of
several states. The process involved an audit of selected cases by
teams consisting of supervisors and social workers from other states’
systems.25 Not all peer review processes have powerful effects; some
are empty formalities or occasions for casual socializing. I would put
the peer review process I know best—the one associated with law
school accreditation—somewhere between the poles of high efficacy
and triviality. In my experience, the schools occasionally get valuable
ideas from the peer critics, but not often. However, the process of
self-assessment that occurs in preparation for the peer sessions is
usually valuable.
Peer review is strikingly underdeveloped in law. In law schools,
legal scholarship is notoriously divorced from practice, and clinical
23.

Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009,

available

at

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande.
24.
ROBERT J. MARDER ET AL., EFFECTIVE PEER REVIEW (2d ed. 2007);
PRATHIBHA VARKEY, MEDICAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 2009).
25.
Kathleen Noonan, Charles Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal

Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare
Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523 (2009).

SIMON - PROOF II

201X:N

4/4/2012 4:00:07 PM

Quality Movement in Law

113

teachers have never developed the art of the case presentation. The
most common type of peer exchange among practitioners is
“continuing legal education,” which even at its best, tends to take the
form of general lectures and discussions only occasionally and vaguely
focused on lawyering. CLE lecturers have an unfortunate tendency to
model their pedagogy on that of the law schools. They are thus much
more likely to talk about recent appellate decisions than about how
they organize their practices or how they respond to recurring
practical issues where statutes and cases provide little guidance.
Within firms, ongoing practice takes place increasingly in groups
or teams that involve peer exchange over current decisions. But as I
noted in connection with root cause analysis, there does not appear to
be any developed practice even within firms of critical retrospective
assessment of past decisions.
Outside counsel rating systems aggregate impressionistic
judgments by clients about their lawyers, sometimes in a very
sophisticated way. The resulting rankings can be informative, but they
do not involve the kind of focused deliberative exchange of the more
developed peer review systems. The client judgments that are
aggregated are not made in a structured group process, and they are
not focused on specific cases and practices. Thus, they do not
produce the diagnostic learning that peer review aims at.
However, there appear to be some more ambitious exceptions.
For example, FMC Technologies engages in “After Action Reviews” of
completed matters. The review involves intense discussion of the
question, “How could the matter have been handled better
(procedurally)?” The process focuses on “continuous improvement as
opposed to dwelling on the past.”26
Recent regulatory reform in New South Wales, Australia, carries
the peer review idea much farther than American requirements. Firms
who adopt the Incorporated Legal Practice (ILP) form must have
“appropriate management systems.”27 The Office of the Legal Services
Commissioner audits periodically (and with greater frequency for firms
considered high-risk) to assess compliance, and it provides technical
assistance to regulated firms. The assistance takes the form, not just
of general lectures, but advice tailored to the circumstances of

26.
Value Practice: Focus on After Action Review as a Way of Adding Value,
ASS’N
CORP.
COUNS.,
http://www.acc.com/advocacy/valuechallenge/toolkit/
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=40522 (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
27.
Christine Parker et al., Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management: An

Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession in New
South Wales, 37 J.L. SOC’Y 466, 471 (2010).
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particular firms.28 This type of oversight and advice is sometimes
provided to American firms from liability insurers, but many U.S.
lawyers, probably including most of those who need it most, do not
receive it.
Such practices are potentially valuable, but from the perspective
of the quality movement, they suffer from an important limitation: They
are confined to matters of “structure and process” and do not
scrutinize judgments in specific cases.

D. Performance Measurement
Of the four categories of quality-related endeavor, performance
measurement is the most familiar and developed in law offices. Firms
use business metrics, such as hours billed in relation to hours worked,
revenues in relation to billings (realization rates), and profits. They
aggregate supervisor, peer, and client judgments of the quality of work
and of results. Such judgments may be made for individual lawyers,
practice groups, or the firm as a whole. Firms use such judgments for
promotion, compensation, and training decisions. Business clients use
them to decide how to allocate their work.
While such metrics and judgments are necessary for efficient
personnel and procurement decisions, they do not necessarily address
quality in the strong sense that the quality movement prescribes. An
ambitious quality effort strives, not just to reward quality, but to
improve it. For that purpose, we need metrics that have diagnostic
value. Declining profits or client retention may tell the firm that it is
doing something wrong, but such metrics do not give it any indication
what that something is. More specific metrics may be more helpful,
but of course, specific metrics can be ambiguous or misleading. In a
hospital, a high mortality rate for cardiac surgery might indicate a
quality problem with the surgical team, but it might also indicate that
the hospital has frailer patients. When regulators forced hospitals to
publish raw mortality data, some surgeons reportedly responded by
trying to avoid vulnerable patients. The regulators’ response was to
adjust the data with an algorithm designed to account for the relative
vulnerability of patients. But such complex metrics are costly to
develop and apply, and some kinds of professional practice are not
measurable in this way.29

28.
Id. at 471-74.
29.
David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25
J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 173-74 (2006).
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In the legal profession, government lawyers appear to have done
the most sophisticated thinking so far on diagnostic measures.30 Many
prosecutors’ offices have focused on conviction rates (including pleas).
But a single-minded focus on this metric can encourage over-charging
(so as to generate pressure to plead to a lesser offense), not to
mention unethically aggressive behavior. The newer techniques take
account of whether convictions were to the offenses charged or to
lesser offenses, and treat high fractions of pleas to lesser charges as
signals of possible over-charging. They also score measures of
timeliness, consistency of charging decisions, and reported victim and
witness satisfaction with their treatment. Some measures are related
to particular local strategies. An office adopting a “broken windows”
policing strategy might measure convictions for specified “quality of
life” offenses. Another experimenting with a drug treatment diversion
program might measure the fraction of certain categories of cases
diverted. Metrics may include estimates of occurrence of specified
crimes in the relevant community.
From a diagnostic point of view, it is useful to distinguish practice
or process metrics from outcome metrics. The practice metrics
measure the extent to which the lawyers are complying with their
standardized work norms. The fraction of cases meeting the relevant
criteria that are diverted to a treatment program would be an example.
Outcome measures report on the extent to which goals are being
achieved. Recidivism rates among arrestees in the diversion categories
would be an example. The practice metrics indicate the extent to
which the program is being implemented. The outcome metrics give
some indication of the extent to which it is accomplishing its goals.31
Of course, the interpretation of such measurements is complex
and speculative. The causal relation between practice (diversion) and
outcome (recidivism) will usually be speculative. A low outcome score
could indicate that the practice was misconceived, but it could also
mean that the outcome measure is inadequate. Note, however, that
for diagnostic purposes, progress does not necessarily require
statistical rigor. Analysis can detect remediable errors and produce
learning even if it does not produce uncontroversial generalizations of
the sort that would support sanctions and rewards. Moreover, even
30.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-422, U.S. ATTORNEYS:
PERFORMANCE-BASED INITIATIVES ARE EVOLVING (2004); see also M. ELAINE NUGENTBOROKOVE ET AL., NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N & AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST.,
EXPLORING THE FEASIBILITY AND EFFICACY OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN PROSECUTION
AND THEIR APPLICATION TO COMMUNITY PROSECUTION (2009).
31.
See ROBERT S. KAPLAN & DAVID P. NORTON, THE BALANCED SCORECARD:
TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO ACTION 147-55 (1996).
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speculative data can usefully direct attention fruitfully and structure
discussion. It would usually not be fair to blame or sanction
prosecutors for increasing crime rates, given the many factors beyond
their control that affect crime. But it is still useful for the prosecutors
to examine crime rate data and consider what it might suggest about
the efficacy of their practices.
Some performance measures, such as conviction rates, are based
on readily available numbers. Others, however, require complex
judgment. The performance assessment instrument for social workers
that colleagues and I studied included scores for qualitative
assessments of such matters as the adequacy of planning and services
for the child in a given case. Experience showed that, as long as
examiners discussed their views with each other when they were
unsure, judgments tended to be consistent. Social scientists have
techniques for establishing “inter-rater reliability” for qualitative
judgments. The techniques are often costly and time-consuming, but
consistency is not necessarily precluded by the qualitative nature of
the relevant judgments.
To judge by public discussions, the quality efforts in private firms
have not begun to exploit the diagnostic and learning potential of
performance measurement to the extent that lawyers in the public
sphere and practitioners in other fields have done.
III. OBSTACLES TO QUALITY EFFORTS IN LAW PRACTICE
Several distinctive conditions may explain the relatively slow
progress of quality initiatives in the legal profession. None seem
insuperable, but some may require institutional reforms before
significant progress can be made.

A. Professional Culture
A few years ago the director of a legal services program explained
to me the process by which the program evaluated its lawyers. For
each lawyer, evaluators interviewed peer and staff colleagues on their
views of the lawyer’s strengths and weaknesses and contacted a sample
of the lawyer’s clients to get their views of the quality of the
representation they received. When I asked whether the evaluation
involved a peer review of a sample of the lawyer’s cases, the director
said no and expressed surprise. “These people are professionals,” he
said.
“They don’t expect others to be second-guessing their
judgments.”
The notion of professionalism implicit in the director’s response is
long-standing. In this view, lawyers practice on their own. They are
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not subject to close supervision. Their judgments tend to be tacit and
ineffable. Their decisions cannot be assessed by lay people, and even
among peers, distinctions between good and bad practice can only be
made in extreme situations.
In this view, the solitary and ineffable nature of professional work
was portrayed as a necessity, but it also came to be seen as a
prerogative. The profession attracted people who liked to work on
their own and disliked supervision. Part of the prestige and dignity of
the professions was tied to these conditions. Thus, it is not surprising
to find professionals resisting the pressures for standardized work or
performance measurement of the sort promoted by the quality
movement.
Professional ideology tends to view the lawyers “independence”
(or isolation) as a safeguard of the client’s interests, and to see almost
any efforts at organizational accountability as presenting threats to
client interests. After abandoning its more categorical opposition, the
bar continues to mount ambiguous resistance to efforts by insurance
companies and legal aid programs to exert organizational control over
the lawyers they compensate on behalf of third-party clients. They
often oppose supervision as inconsistent with the lawyer’s duty to
reject “interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional
judgment.”32
To an important extent, such views seem anachronistic. Lawyers,
like most professionals, now practice for the most part in large
organizations. They tend to do their work in groups. These groups
are often interdisciplinary.
In addition to inducing reflection,
standardization facilitates communication across disciplines.
The legal aid director with whom I discussed staff evaluation
assumed that the major satisfactions of professional work were
connected to freedom from supervision. It’s true that supervision can
be oppressive. However, the newer style of professional work is more
collaborative than the traditional one, and many people will find this
collaborative dimension more satisfying. Moreover, the newer style
potentially increases the experience of self-conscious learning and
innovation.
Organizational control can threaten client interests, but a key
lesson of the quality movement is that it is also potentially a safeguard
of them. Error studies show that solitary ineffable professional
32.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f)(2) (2011); see, e.g., ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Lawyers Participation in For-Profit Prepaid
Legal Service Plan, Formal Op. 87-355 (1987) (suggesting that almost any supervision
by provider of prepaid legal insurance of lawyers’ activities has “a potential for
improper control” under this rule).
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judgment often produces errors that can be avoided by institutional
controls. Although we don’t have comparable studies for lawyers,
there is no reason to think that lawyers are immune from the cognitive
limitations that quality reforms are designed to correct. The bar’s
preoccupation with independence needs to be tempered with a
recognition that too much independence is at least as dangerous as too
little.33

B. Economic Context
The quality movement came to medicine only after third-party
payment became the dominant manner of compensation for medical
services. It came at the insistence of the third-party payors—the
insurers and the government. In law, we also see insurers and the
government as salient movers behind quality initiatives, but in contrast
to medicine, third party payors account for a small fraction of the
market. Most legal bills are paid by clients.
We might expect clients to push quality reforms, and as I’ve
noted, we do to some extent. Client efforts vary, however, depending
on whether they are government actors, businesses, or individuals.
We’ve seen that, among clients, government agencies have
undertaken the most sophisticated efforts to reform the practices of
the lawyers who work for them. Businesses with large legal bills have
also been active, but their efforts appear not to have been as energetic
or creative as those of public-sector actors. A possible distinction has
to do with the relative duration and breadth of the lawyer-client
relations. Government agencies and their lawyers have a long-term
and encompassing relation.
Business lawyers and their clients
sometimes have such relations but more often do not. The deeper and
longer the relation, the more it makes sense to make the kinds of
relational investments required for quality processes. The most

33.
A major step in this direction is Model Rule 5.1, which mandates that law
firm partners make efforts to ensure that “the firm has in effect [reasonable]
measures” to ensure compliance with their ethical obligations. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2011). Prior to that rule, professional responsibility doctrine
treated lawyers as solitary individuals concerned only with their own conduct. See
Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-6
(1991); see also Parker et al., supra note 27, at 493, 499 (reporting that client
complaints appear to have declined in Australian firms subject to rules mandating
organizational controls, relative to firms not subject to the rules).
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ambitious quality initiatives in the private sector seem associated with
relational contracting.34
If government clients seem to be taking care of their interests in
quality and business clients at least have the capacity to do so, that
leaves individual clients, particularly one-shot unsophisticated clients,
uncovered. The malpractice action is designed to protect them, but it
is a crude and expensive method of quality control. The medical error
studies indicate that only a small fraction of even serious errors
eventuate in tort claims.35 Preventive regulation seems desirable. As
long as the organized profession exercises predominant control over
the regulatory process, prevention-oriented reform will be difficult, but
the Australian example shows that significant progress is possible in
some circumstances.
Another pertinent economic circumstance that differentiates
lawyers from doctors and some other professions is that lawyers
operate in a more competitive environment. Competitive concerns
would inhibit peer review and transparency initiatives. Lawyers would
not willingly participate in a process that might disclose weaknesses in
their practices to competitors who could use the information to solicit
their clients. This obstacle is daunting but not insuperable. Insurers,
regulators, and bar associations could construct a review process that
minimized the risk of subjecting practitioners to review by competitors.
Retired lawyers and judges might be good candidates for reviewers.

C. Confidentiality
Error detection and peer review raise two types of confidentiality
concerns. First, there is the question of whether quality assessment
information should be fully available to the client whose representation
is being assessed. The disclosure of errors could lead to malpractice
claims. Disclosure will sometimes be in the firm’s self-interest. If the
client is likely to discover the error anyway, it is better for the firm
that the client learns from the firm itself. And disclosure will
sometimes enable lawyer and client to take actions to mitigate the
effects of the error. But no doubt there are some situations involving
errors that are large, unlikely to be discovered in the absence of

34.
David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney/Client Relationship, 62 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 478, 478-557 (2009).
35.
A. Russell Localio et al., Relation between Malpractice Claims and
Adverse Events Due to Negligence—Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III,
325 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 245, 248-49 (1991) (estimating on basis of extensive empirical
study that less than one in seven medical errors eventuate in malpractice claims).
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disclosure, and irremediable where disclosure would be strongly against
the firm’s interest. Moreover, even where review does not disclose
substantial errors, critical comments by reviewers, if disclosed, might
undermine client confidence. Lawyers fearing such consequences
would be reluctant to engage in review or to assess candidly.
It seems incompatible with fiduciary commitment to the client to
exempt the lawyer from responsibility to disclose substantial errors,
however painful that duty may become.36 However, since that duty
may inhibit quality efforts, some regulatory pressure—for example,
mandated review processes and strong penalties for breach of
disclosure duties37—may be necessary in some practice contexts,
especially those involving unsophisticated clients. On the other hand,
while the client’s interest in learning about errors seems large, her
interest in learning critical comments made in review processes seems
much weaker. Here the case for a “privilege of self-critical analysis”
and corresponding exemption from ethical disclosure duties seems
plausible. Statutes provide some protections of this kind in the
medical peer review context, and some states have enacted a “selfaudit” privilege for insurance companies.38
The other set of confidentiality issues concerns the possibility
that review might inadvertently waive client confidentiality vis-à-vis
outsiders. Any peer review involving outsiders to the firm would
require client consent, and there is a risk that such consent might be
construed as a waiver of privilege with respect to the world at large,
rather than just with respect to reviewers.39 Again, the problem could
be solved at little cost with an explicit exception from waiver doctrine
for disclosures in connection with good faith peer review and quality
control efforts.
36.
Benjamin P. Cooper, The Lawyer’s Duty to Inform His Client of His Own
Malpractice, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 175-79, 213-14 (2009).
37.
An optimal sanction regime should generally set higher penalties for
undisclosed than for disclosed malpractice. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).
38.
Marder et al., supra note 24, at 21-24; Christine A. Edwards & John E.
Court, Good Corporate Behavior Redux—The Federal Self-Evaluative Privilege,
METROPOLITAN
CORP.
COUNS.,
June
2007,
at
13,
available
at
http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/publications/GoodCorporateBehaviorRedux.pdf;
see also Brendan F. Quigley, The Need to Know: Law Firm Internal Investigations and
the Intra-Firm Dissemination of Privileged Communications, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
889 (2007) (discussing the extent to which lawyers can assert privilege against clients
for intra-firm discussion of their responsibilities to the clients).
39.
See, e.g., In Re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987) (client’s consent
to lawyer’s disclosure can waive privilege beyond scope of intended disclosure).
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The confidentiality obstacles to the more ambitious quality efforts
are substantial as doctrine now stands. But it seems likely that the
bar could obtain legislative changes that would resolve the problems if
it had the inclination to do seek them.
CONCLUSION
Despite some notable initiatives and the increasing use of quality
rhetoric, the bar has lagged in the embrace of the quality reforms that
have transformed other professions. The inhibitions on reform protect
clients and lawyers from the dangers that reform might compromise
client interests or lawyer morale, but they also preclude the benign
potential of reform, including the fostering of service that is more
reflective, adaptive, and transparent to clients.

